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ABSTRACT
Objective: The Orthopaedic Error Index for hospitals
aims to provide the first national assessment of the
relative safety of provision of orthopaedic surgery.
Design: Cross-sectional study (retrospective analysis
of records in a database).
Setting: The National Reporting and Learning System
is the largest national repository of patient-safety
incidents in the world with over eight million error
reports. It offers a unique opportunity to develop novel
approaches to enhancing patient safety, including
investigating the relative safety of different healthcare
providers and specialties.
Participants: We extracted all orthopaedic error
reports from the system over 1 year (2009–2010).
Outcome measures: The Orthopaedic Error Index
was calculated as a sum of the error propensity and
severity. All relevant hospitals offering orthopaedic
surgery in England were then ranked by this
metric to identify possible outliers that warrant further
attention.
Results: 155 hospitals reported 48 971 orthopaedic-
related patient-safety incidents. The mean Orthopaedic
Error Index was 7.09/year (SD 2.72); five hospitals
were identified as outliers. Three of these units were
specialist tertiary hospitals carrying out complex
surgery; the remaining two outlier hospitals had
unusually high Orthopaedic Error Indexes: mean 14.46
(SD 0.29) and 15.29 (SD 0.51), respectively.
Conclusions: The Orthopaedic Error Index has
enabled identification of hospitals that may be putting
patients at disproportionate risk of orthopaedic-related
iatrogenic harm and which therefore warrant further
investigation. It provides the prototype of a summary
index of harm to enable surveillance of unsafe care
over time across institutions. Further validation and
scrutiny of the method will be required to assess its
potential to be extended to other hospital specialties in
the UK and also internationally to other health systems
that have comparable national databases of patient-
safety incidents.
INTRODUCTION
The delivery of safer healthcare remains a
challenge globally.1 Over a decade ago, the
Institute of Medicine published the seminal
report, ‘To err is human’,1 which revealed the
previously under-recognised high burden of
morbidity and mortality associated with iatro-
genic harm. This was then followed by the
equally inﬂuential Crossing the Quality Chasm,
which highlighted the need to develop and
make greater use of error reporting systems to
enable the generation of learning from
patient-safety incidents and inform opportun-
ities for system-level interventions to reduce
future risks of harm.2 The challenge for
healthcare systems globally remains the consist-
ent delivery of safer care and the associated
surveillance of safety within an organisation.
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Several notable strengths of the study: a large
national dataset was drawn upon; comprising of
over 48 000 orthopaedic reports and the data
used are specifically for patient safety.
▪ There is a trade-off between the depth and
breadth of the analysis.
▪ Existing learning from national patient-safety
reporting systems is limited; some of the infor-
mation is lost in translation and it is unclear
whether all patient-safety incidents are indeed
reported.
▪ Secondary analysis of data, including the
absence of specific information needed and
necessities of using proxies.
▪ Biases exist at several levels: reporting of harmful
versus non-harmful events and correct classifica-
tion of categories of harm. Underlying factors for
these biases, such as level of patient-safety culture
within institutions, were not assessed.
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Modern day healthcare involves an array of compli-
cated diagnostic and therapeutic decisions affected by
the system within which these occur. Poorly functioning
systems and teams have the potential to impact on
patient safety. Inevitably, there will be unexpected vari-
ation in access, outcomes and quality of care. Whereas
some variation is legitimate and indeed desirable (eg,
slower surgeons should not be asked to work faster), it is
the unwarranted variation that is a major cause of
concern to policy-makers and regulators.3 A much-
favoured approach for describing this variability is the
use of hospital-wide mortality rates. Proponents have
argued that these tools provide useful metrics about pro-
blems with the quality of inpatient care; uncover system-
wide failures and can help patients to choose the safest
hospital.4
Patient-safety reporting systems are unused sources of
data for the surveillance of harm which enable learning
from errors, so that the insights create opportunities for
system-level interventions to reduce future risks of harm.
Some successes have been reported, for example, in
identifying previously undetected risks of new drugs or
procedures, but there remain doubts about the wider
value of investments in developing and maintaining
large-scale incident reporting systems.5 Databases of
error reports now exist in many parts of the world,
including the UK and the USA.6–8 The UK’s National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) was launched
in 2003 and has since accrued over eight million
records, making it the most substantial repository of
patient-safety incidents in the world. Analyses of this
database have revealed risks in a range of clinical
areas,9 10 but what has been lacking are high-level, valid
summary metrics to allow surveillance of harm across a
whole healthcare system in a way that allows, for
example: comparison between hospitals; monitoring of
time trends and a baseline for assessing and evaluating
interventions. Some doubts exist about the wider value
of investments in developing and maintaining large-scale
incident reporting systems.5
In this paper, we report on the development of one
such summary statistic, which aims to (unlike the cur-
rently used proxy measures of harm such as Hospital
Standardised Mortality Ratios) provide a more direct
measure of safety.11 We developed and tested this
measure in the ﬁeld of orthopaedic surgery. This spe-
cialty was chosen because it is associated with a relatively
high level of harm.12 For example, from 2000 to 2006,
an equivalent of US$321 million was paid in adult ortho-
paedic surgery-related negligence settlements in the
UK.13 Similar ﬁgures were reported the Physician
Insurers Association of America.14
METHODS
Developing a model for an error index
Errors will occur in complex systems such as healthcare,
and their frequency will relate to the number of
procedures undertaken. Such assumptions are made in
other ﬁelds of risk. In road trafﬁc accidents, for
example, predicted crash frequency is a linear function
of average daily trafﬁc.15
A simple measure of error is the frequency of errors
occurring in any hospital. However, since frequency is a
function of the number of procedures that have been
carried out, we therefore deemed the frequency of
errors per unit of procedure as a more appropriate
measure.16 We call this the error propensity. In order to
calculate this, we extracted data on all orthopaedic
reports made by all English hospitals reporting to the
UK’s NRLS over a 12-month period from 1 April 2009 to
31 March 2010. In parallel, we approximated the total
number of orthopaedic procedures carried out in each
hospital using data from the national Hospital Episode
Statistics (HES; 2009–2010) database,17 which is a man-
datory national database of all patient visits to National
Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England, in order to
estimate the error propensity. We deﬁned an ortho-
paedic procedure as any patient entry that involves an
Ofﬁce of Population Censuses and Surveys Classiﬁcation
of Interventions and Procedures code in the OP1 ﬁeld
of HES with a treatment specialty code of 110.
A second component of the Orthopaedic Error Index
(OEI) reﬂects the impact the error has on the patients,
that is, how much harm it caused. We call this the error
severity, which is based on categories of harm. Harm was
deﬁned by user self-reports; the degree of harm was clas-
siﬁed as either: no harm, low harm (minimal harm—
patient(s) required extra observation or minor treat-
ment), moderate harm (short-term harm—patient(s)
required further treatment, or procedure), severe harm
(permanent or long-term harm) or death. Further
details about the structure of the NRLS are provided in
online supplementary appendix 1. We created our
summary statistic using principles laid out in the
Standards for Statistical Models used for Public
Reporting of Health Outcomes.18
The OEI comprised the two main domains of error:
the propensity of errors (P) and the severity of harm
(S). The mathematical derivation of the OEI is given in
online supplementary appendix 2.
Analyses
We estimated P, S and OEI and their SEs for each hos-
pital using STATA V.11 (StataCorp 2011; Stata Statistical
Software: Release 12, College Station, Texas, USA:
StataCorp LP). Since P, S and the OEI deviated from
normality, they were ﬁrst transformed: OEI using a loga-
rithmic transformation and propensity and severity by
taking their reciprocal values. We sought to identify out-
liers by creating control lines at one, two and three SDs.
We plotted OEI (per 1000 procedures) against number
of procedures and superimposed lines representing the
mean and ±2SD and 3SD of predicted OEI values.
Funnel plots provided a visual representation of the data
and have been used widely in health services research to
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compare institutions. We deﬁned outliers as those with
an OEI outside the range of µ±3σ, where µ is the mean
and σ is the SD for the whole sample. These hospitals
require closer scrutiny.19
RESULTS
OEI for all hospitals in England
In England, 155 NHS hospitals reported 48 971 patient-
safety incidents with varying degrees of harm: 34 530/
48 971 (70.5%) no harm; 11 529/48 971 (23.5%) low
harm; 2632/48 971 (5.4%) moderate harm; 217/48 971
(0.4%) severe harm and 63/48 971 (0.1%) deaths in the
specialty of trauma and orthopaedic surgery during
2009–2010. The mean hospital OEI was 7.09 (SD 2.72).
There was a correlation between the number of proce-
dures and error reports of 0.40; therefore an increase of
1000 orthopaedic procedures generated approximately
38 additional error reports (ﬁgure 1).
Identifying outlier hospitals
Among the 155 hospitals, 5 lay outside the prespeciﬁed
control limits (ﬁgure 2). These were hospitals that had
relatively small numbers of procedures, but high OEI
values. Of note, there is an almost linear association with
larger hospitals having fewer errors.
DISCUSSION
The OEI is the ﬁrst attempt to develop automated proce-
dures to interrogate a national database of patient-safety
incidents in order to identify hospitals at disproportionate
risk of iatrogenic harm. Applying this tool to all hospitals
providing orthopaedic care identiﬁed ﬁve outlying hospi-
tals: three tertiary care providers and two secondary care
providers. While the higher rates may be expected
because of case-mix considerations in the tertiary care
sites, such deviations are not to be expected in the sec-
ondary care providers.
One of these two secondary care providers has subse-
quently been highlighted nationally as providing sub-
standard care due to failures in administration,
management and nursing.20
At present, the NHS and other health systems inter-
nationally lack direct indicators of safety. Mortality is a
proxy measure and cannot be used in isolation to assess
the safety of a hospital. Opponents argue that the con-
struction of Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratios is
ﬂawed as the index is unable to discriminate between
inevitable and preventable deaths, and that the huge
variability in care suggested by these metrics cannot be
accounted for by variable quality of care alone.11
Although we did not distinguish between avoidable and
non-avoidable incidents in our analysis, previous work by
the group has shown that most orthopaedic incidents
that result in harm could have been prevented if safety
measures had been implemented.21
The process of identifying outliers could be associated
with stigma and extensive resource allocation, both
ﬁnancial and reputational.11 Nevertheless, in organisa-
tions that foster a culture of reporting and learning, this
method should be viewed as one of the many tools that
need to be used in parallel to understanding how unsafe
the care is in that particular organisation. The use of
outlier analysis in singularity does not ensure safe care;
it merely acts as a trigger for further checks. One of the
hospitals that we identiﬁed as an outlier, and that had
been the subject of national inquiries, was also noted to
have a high Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio; an
excess of up to 1200 deaths occurred here.22 We have
thus shown that a patient-safety reporting system, which
until recently has been used as a repository collecting
reports of errors, can be used to identify institutions that
may pose a disproportionate risk to patient safety.
However, the work requires greater scrutiny and valid-
ation; the purpose of this undertaking was to see if
national patient-safety reporting systems can be used for
surveillance of unsafe care. As such, we have created a
novel metric - the OEI - which is a direct marker of
patient safety in individual hospitals. The thrust behind
this idea has been the occurrence of several high-proﬁle
cases of hospitals such as Alder Hey, Mid-Staffordshire
and Stockport NHS hospitals, where a catalogue of
medical errors occurred that resulted in varying degrees
of harm to the patients.23 Most people would agree that
in an era of large datasets, regulators and advisory
bodies should have mechanisms to identify hospitals that
are struggling to deliver high-quality care at an earlier
stage so that corrective responses can be initiated.
Monitoring trends in unsafe care over time would be
invaluable. They would help, in addition to identifying
outliers, in evaluating the effect of safety initiatives and
case-mix of patients during different periods of the year.
Despite alarming cases of unsafe care, it appears that
the NHS is still ill-equipped to identify high-risk hospi-
tals through early warning systems.24 More recently,
attempts have been made in the UK to identify failing
hospitals by using nationwide surveillance tools which
collect data prospectively: the NHS Safety Thermometer
that collects data on four domains—venous thrombo-
embolism, urinary tract infections, pressure ulcers and
falls;25 the National Surgical Quality Improvement
Program which collects measures of outcomes to
improve surgical care;26 and the Global Trigger Tool
which measures adverse events.27 However, not all hospi-
tals use these tools. Ours is the ﬁrst tool that uses data
from an entire national healthcare system.
Strengths and limitations
Errors can be caused by active failures, for example, mis-
takes and latent conditions, such as failure of system pro-
cesses.28 Usually primary data from small, in-depth,
qualitative inquiries are used to identify factors that con-
tributed to the errors. The main strength of this
approach is that data are speciﬁc for patient safety, but a
major limitation is the trade-off between the depth and
breadth of the analysis. We sought to investigate the use
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of routinely collected patient-safety incident reports to
create a numerical index that could help to provide a
complementary perspective by supporting the monitor-
ing of the overall system-wide safety of healthcare provi-
sion. Other key strengths of our work include drawing
on a large national dataset, comprising of over 48 000
orthopaedic reports, and utilising the full body of data
reporting on patient-safety incidents spanning the full
spectrum of severity from no harm to death. At present,
the learning from national patient-safety reporting
systems is limited; some of the information is lost in
translation and it is unclear whether all patient-safety
incidents are indeed reported.29 The sensitivity of the
NRLS at picking up errors has been questioned in the
past30 the low power of the study limits generalisability
of results to the entire NRLS. Furthermore, all hospitals
use the same mechanism of reporting incidents, so the
effects of bias and uncertainty are limited with the OEI.
Nevertheless this should not deter exploratory work
such as ours. We are also cognisant of the fact that there
is likely to be a variation in reporting according to the
patient-safety culture within hospitals; so a hospital with
a high OEI may be one that has an open culture and
encourages staff to report patient-safety incidents.31 Of
equal importance is the fact that NRLS was a voluntary
reporting system until April 2010, when mandatory
reporting was introduced for serious untoward inci-
dents.32 In ﬁgure 2, we showed that large hospitals
(number of orthopaedic procedures) are associated with
fewer errors. This must be interpreted with caution as
we have not been able to adjust for patient or procedure
case-mix due to the paucity and anonymity of the data.
Based on work elsewhere, it has been stipulated that spe-
cialised surgical services should be provided in tertiary
hospitals, although geographical or logistical impedi-
ments may occur.33 We cannot make this claim based on
our ﬁndings. Some local systems of risk management in
hospitals opt for root cause analyses to develop local
solutions to mitigate harm to patients, but these are not
shared nationally, and limited information may be pro-
vided to national reporting systems. These systems rely
on patient-safety experts methodically trawling through
Figure 1 Relationship between
number of error reports and
volume of procedures.
Figure 2 Orthopaedic Error Index for all hospitals in England.
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patient-safety incidents by severity and frequency,
thereby leading to the production of quarterly reports,
alerts and rapid response solutions.34 Such analyses are
time-consuming and, as the number of reports rapidly
increases, may in the future be unsustainable.35 36 There
is also a non-cohesive approach globally to identifying
unsafe hospitals. The multitude of quality indicators that
are proxy measures of unsafe care is overwhelming. The
OEI is a surveillance tool that can enable direct evalu-
ation of safer care in hospitals. It is, we believe, a novel
benchmarking tool to assess patient safety across hospi-
tals using a large patient-safety reporting system.
The main limitations are those inherent to any sec-
ondary analysis of data, including the absence of speciﬁc
information needed and necessities of using proxies.
Ideally, we would have preferred to link HES data to cor-
responding NRLS incidents. At present, this is not pos-
sible, as the latter does not allow for patient
identiﬁcation via NHS identiﬁcation numbers. HES data
will also give an approximation of orthopaedic and
trauma procedures due to coding inaccuracies. However,
these are, we believe, largely mitigated in the present
analysis by the fact that the data were collected to study
error and we refer to our analyses as secondary only
because the analysis approach we employed was
unanticipated when the study was designed. However,
the OEI has several potential limitations. Reporting of
patient-safety incidents is a subjective exercise and vari-
ation in the dataset is bound to exist. Biases also exist at
several levels: reporting of harmful versus non-harmful
events and correct classiﬁcation of categories of harm.37
Underlying factors for these biases, such as the level of
patient-safety culture within institutions, were not
assessed.38 Further work on measuring the extent and
likely impact of such biases is therefore now needed.
CONCLUSIONS
With the proliferation of patient-safety reporting systems
around the world and an ever-increasing number of
patient-safety incidents reported to them, sophisticated
analytical techniques are required to identify hospitals
that need to strengthen their emphasis on patient safety.
This is the ﬁrst time, to our knowledge, that a surveil-
lance mechanism for safety has been proposed using a
reporting system.
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